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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this Appeal are the Plaintiff/Appellant/ 
Petitioner, Bonnie Kay Harris, and the Def endant/Appe nil II i u, IIIIIIK II I -H1) 
Gutierrez Spivey, aka Theresa Spivey. 
efendantf ii i 1 ho trial court case were Utah 
Retirement Systems and the Estate of Glendon G. Spivey, deceased• 
Neither of those defendants submitted anything the trial court 
proceedings. In il :-"i TTi : li it: n : " / ' il :. i ' n ppeals proceedings Utah 
Retirement Systems submitted a Stipulation signed by all parties 
named in the trial court case and an order was signed by the Utah 
Court of Appeals on 2:1 February, pi'iti imiiMiiy n 1 "«i 1 »n 1 IHJ iiLdii 
Retirement Systems from the appeal. 
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REFERENCES TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed an unpublished Memorandum 
Decision dated October 24, 1996. A copy is attached as Exhibit 1. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over a Utah 
Court of Appeals' decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-
2(3)(a) (1995). Under section 78-2-(5), the Court has "sole 
discretion in granting or denying this petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
There has been no cross-petition for certiorari been 
filed. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL 
The issues presented by this Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
are as follows: 
1. Does this case involve special and important reasons 
justifying the granting of certiorari under Rule 46 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure? 
2. Can Petitioner now cite and raise a new issue and an old 
case, Enalert v. Enalert, 576 P. 2d 1274 (Utah 1978) which was 
never raised in petitioner's briefs in her appeal at the Utah Court 
of Appeals? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals decision err in holding that in 
1980, when Plaintiff/Appellant/Petitioner, Bonnie Harris and 
Glendon 6. Spivey (now deceased) divorced retirement benefits were 
not recognized as divisible marital property? 
1 
4. Did the Court of Appeals err in Ostler v. Ostler. 789 P. 
2d 713 (Utah App. 1990), Throclcmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P. 2d 
121 (Utah App. 1988), and in the present case in holding that 
pension and retirement benefits would only be granted a spouse in 
a divorce decree issued after the holding in Woodward v. Woodward, 
656 P. 2d 431 (Utah 1982)? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES. RULES. AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Cases: 
Ostler v. Ostler. 789 P. 2d 713 (Utah App. 1990) 
Throckmorton vs. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988) 
Woodward vs. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) 
Statutes: 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, Section 78-2-2(3)(a) 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, Section 78-2-(5) 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(j) 
Rule 46 
Rule 49(a)(9) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
In 1995, 15 years after a divorce and three months after the 
death of the husband (Glendon 6. Spivey), the ex-wife (Appellant-
Plaintiff /Petitioner, Bonnie Harris) filed a petition in a separate 
case (not the divorce case) seeking to modify the property division 
in the divorce and obtain retirement benefits of the deceased ex-
husband (Glendon G. Spivey)• 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Bonnie Harris and Glendon G. Spivey were divorced May 15, 1980 
in case no. 53,269, Fourth District Court, State of Utah. 
Glendon G. Spivey died December 27, 1994. 
On March 31, 1995, Petitioner, Bonnie Harris (Plaintiff/ 
Appellant), filed a petition in the Fourth Judicial District in a 
new case (#954400677-not the divorce case) seeking to obtain 
retirement funds of Glendon G. Spivey 
The deceased husband's widow, Theresa Gutierrez Spivey, 
(Defendant/Appellee/Respondent), filed a motion to dismiss the 
petition of the ex-wife (Plaintiff/Appellant/Petitioner) to modify 
divorce decree entered 15 years previously. 
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds 
of (i) laches, (ii) res judicata (Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 
supra), and Ostler v. Ostler, supra), and (iii) that a divorce 
decree cannot be modified in an action brought after the death of 
one of the spouses. 
The ex-wife, Bonnie Harris, appealed the trial court's 
dismissal ruling to the Utah Court of Appeals which affirmed the 
trial court's order of dismissal on the basis of court decisions in 
Ostler v. Ostler, supra, and Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, supra. 
The Utah Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision dated October 24, 
1996, stated "Having determined that the decision can be affirmed 
on the basis of the foregoing authority, we do no reach the other 
bases relied upon by the trial court.11 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Glendon G. Spivey (sometimes hereafter referred to as 
decedent) and Plaintiff-Bonnie Harris were married May 5, 
1962.(R.6#8.) 
2. Plaintiff-Harris and decedent were divorced May 15, 1980, 
in case no. 53,289, District Court of Utah County, State of Utah. 
The decree of divorce was granted after a trial in which both 
plaintiff and Glendon G. Spivey were represented by counsel. 
Plaintiff was represented by Brent D. Young, Attorney. (R.1,2,3,6.) 
Decedent was represented by attorney Thomas Taylor. (R.22.) 
3. Financial Declarations were filed in the original divorce 
action by Plaintiff (R.27-24.), and Glendon G. Spivey. (R. 24-22.) 
4. The divorce decree entered May 15, 1980, is silent as to 
any distribution of retirement funds or 401k or 457 plans as to 
both parties. (R.3.) 
5 • Subsequent to the divorce Plaintiff-Bonnie Harris married 
Craig J. Harris on November 7, 1982. (R.45.) Glendon G. Spivey (now 
deceased) married Defendant- Theresa Gutierrez on November 27, 
1982.(R.45.) 
6. A son, Wade, was born to Glendon Spivey and Defendant-
Theresa G. Spivey on May 7, 1985. (R.45.) 
7. During the marriage between plaintiff and Glendon G. 
Spivey the plaintiff-Bonnie Harris worked for Signet ics. Glendon G. 
Spivey worked for Provo City. (R.45 #2 and 3.) 
8. According to the records of the Utah State Retirement 
Office, Glendon G. Spivey retired October 16, 1991, as an employee 
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of the City of Provo. (R.39,40,41,44.) 
9. In 1990 and 1991, Glendon G. Spivey changed the 
beneficiaries on his retirement and 4OIK retirement plan naming his 
widow, Theresa Spivey as beneficiary in accord with statute.(R.39-
42.) 
10. Glendon G. Spivey died on December 27, 1994, leaving as 
his surviving widow, Theresa Spivey (Appellee-Defendant), his wife 
of 12 years, and their son, Wade, then nine years of age who are 
the beneficiaries of his retirement benefit and his 401K 
plan.(R.44 #9,and 39,40,41,44.) 
11. Defendant-Spivey and her son Wade Spivey are dependent on 
the monthly income received as beneficiaries of decedent-Glendon G. 
Spivey's retirement pension and 401K plan to meet current and 
future health, welfare, education and living expenses, and will be 
seriously adversely affected should the pension and 401K plan be 
reduced or eliminated. (R.44 #13.) 
12. On March 31, 1995, fifteen years after the divorce 
between Plaintiff and Glendon G. Spivey, and three months after 
Glendonvs death, Plaintiff filed this separate action, case no. 
954400677DA, seeking to modify the divorce decree dated May 15, 
1980, in case no. 53,289. (R.7.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PETITION DOES NOT RAISE ANY ISSUE MEETING THE 
CRITERIA FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULES 46 and 49(a)(9) OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Petitioner does not cite which provision under Rule 46, Utah 
5 
Rules of Appellate Procedure that she is relying on, but presumably 
it is Rule 46(a)(2) 
Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states in part 
as follows: 
"Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, 
but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for 
special and important reasons. The following, while neither 
controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's 
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be 
considered. 
•••(a)(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a 
question of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict 
with a decision of the Supreme Court;11 
Rule 49(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
reequires a petition for writ of certiorari to state: 
•••(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and 
concise argument explaining the special and important reasons 
as provided in Rule 46 for the issuance of the writ. 
Petitioner has failed to comply with the requirements of Rules 
46 and 49(a)(9)• There are no statements in the petition fulfilling 
the requirements of the rules. Petitioner does not raise any issue 
meeting the requirement for certiorari. 
What we have is a disgruntled litigant seeking to reverse an 
unfavorable decision. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT GRANT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON 
A CLAIM OF ERROR WHEN THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CITE OR MAKE SUCH 
ARGUMENT TO THE COURT OF APPEAL. 
Petitioner never cited nor raised any question concerning 
Enalert v. Enalert. 576 P. 2d 1274 (Utah 1978), in either her 
appellate brief or her reply brief in the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Petitioner now attempts to raise a new issue and case for the 
6 
first time. 
Rule 24 (j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states: 
"(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When 
pertinent and significant authorities come to the 
attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a 
party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate 
court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed 
in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference 
either to the page of the brief or to a point argued 
orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter 
shall without argument state the reasons for the 
supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 
7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Petitioner cannot meet the requirements of Rule 24 (j) since 
she already was aware of Enalert v. Enalert, supra, citing it in 
her Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss at the trial 
court level and failed to argue it in her Brief on Appeal. 
Rule 24 (j) states the citation of additional authorities must 
be done before a decision is rendered. This was not done in this 
case. The Utah Court of Appeals decision was issued October 24, 
1996. It is too late for petitioner to raise a new issue and case. 
III. DESPITE THE FAILURE TO GIVE A BASIS FOR THE PETITION FOR 
CERTIORARI THIS COURT SHOULD NOT GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE COURT 
OF APPEALS DECISION WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT PENSION AND 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS WERE NOT RECOGNIZED AS DIVISIBLE MARITAL 
PROPERTY UNTIL WOODWARD V. WOODWARD. SUPRA, WAS DECIDED IN 1982. 
This court held in Bennett v. Bennett. 607 P. 2d 839 (Utah 
1980) that the husband's retirement fund had no present value and 
could not be divided. 
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It was not until Bennett v, Bennett, supra, was over ruled in 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P. 2d 431 (Utah 1982), that the Supreme 
Court clearly stated that retirement and pension rights of 
divorcing parties were subject to being divided in a divorce 
action. 
The Utah Court of Appeals was correct in its holding. 
IV. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN OSTLER V. 
OSTLER, SUPRA, AND THROCKMORTON V. THROCKMORTON, SUPRA, WHEN IT 
STATED THAT PENSION AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS SHOULD ONLY BE DIVIDED 
IN POST WOODWARD V. WOODWARD, supra DIVORCE CASES. 
The Court of Appeals stated at pages 123-124 in Throckmorton 
v. Throckmorton,supra: 
•••"We must determine whether the subsequent legal 
recognition of retirement benefits as marital property 
subject to distribution in a divorce case is a 
substantial change of circumstances, thereby precluding 
the application of res judicata. Or more specifically, 
whether Woodward should be given retroactive effect.11 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 
supra, then discussed the Arizona Court of Appeals decision in 
Guffev v. LaChance, 127 Ariz. 140, 618 P. 2d 634 (Ct. App. 1980). 
Guffey which involved a wife seeking to modify a seven-and-one-
half year-old divorce decree in order to share in her former 
husband's military retirement benefits. The divorce decree was 
silent regarding his pension. The Utah Court of Appeals in 
Throckmorton at page 124 quotes the Arizona court as follows: 
" (t) here is a compelling policy interest favoring the 
finality of property settlements" and this policy would 
be "greatly undermined if the court were to allow the 
potential for reexamination of every military divorce 
prior to the enactment of the rule." Id. 618 P. 2d at 
8 
636. 
The Utah Court of Appeals continued at page 124 in 
Throckmorton stating: 
"We agree with the Arizona Court of Appeals and find 
that legal recognition of a new category of property 
rights after a divorce decree has been entered, is not 
itself sufficient to establish a substantial change of 
circumstances justifying a reevaluation of a prior 
property division. Thus, we hold that the legal 
principles articulated in Woodward, should only be given 
prospective application.11 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, supra , brought stability in the 
courts as well as recognizing the divisibility of retirement and 
pension assets as set forth in Woodward v. Woodward. supra. 
Otherwise the courts could be flooded with petitions to modify 
prior divorce decree property divisions made years ago. 
Woodward v. Woodward, supra was decided in 1982, and is 
directly applicable to this case where the Spivey divorce was 
entered in 1980, two years prior to Woodward. 
The holding in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, supra, was 
reiterated in 1990, by the Court of Appeals in Ostler v. Ostler, 
supra. Those decisions deal with finality of decisions involving 
the division of property and are also in keeping with the Court of 
Appeals' earlier decision in Porco v. Porco, 752 P. 2d 365 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
The petition for writ of certiorari doe not raise any issue 
meeting the criteria for certiorari. Petitioner has failed to met 
her burden under the provisions of Rules 24(j), 46, and 49 (a) (9), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
9 
Enalert v. Enalert, supra was never raised to the Court of 
Appeals and the time to do so has passed under Rule 24 (j), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Utah Court of Appeals did not err 
in concluding that Woodward v. Woodward, supra, first recognized 
that retirement and pension rights could be divided and that a 
division of retirement and pension rights would only be made in 
divorce cases decided after Woodward v. Woodward, supra. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant/Respondent-Theresa Spivey 
respectfully requests this Court to deny the petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
DATED this 21st day of January, 1997. 
j 
M. DAYLE JEFFS /f // VERNON L. SNOW 
Attorney for D^fen/ant/ Attorney for Defendant/ 
Respondent-Theresa 6. Spivey Respondent-Theresa 6. Spivey 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original and ten copies of Theresa 
Gutierrez Spivey's Response in Opposition to the Petition For Writ 
of Certiorari of Defendant/Appellee/Respondent, was delivered to 
the Utah Supreme Court, Room 332, Utah State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, and t! at two copies were delivered to Sidney 
S. Gilbert, Personal Representative of the Estate of Glendon G. 
Spivey, deceased, at the ad iress set forth below, and two copies 
were mailed to Charles A. S hultz, attorney for the Petitioner,by 
placing the same in the Uni ed States mail, postage prepaid, this 
JLzf day of January, 1997, addressed as follows: 
CHARLES A. SCHULTZ 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. BOX 5526382 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6382 
(Mailed) 
SIDNEY S. GILBERT, C.P.A. 
190 West 800 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
(Delivered) 
VERNON L. SNO* 
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BONNIE HARRIS V. THERESA GUTIERREZ SPIVEY 
MEMORANDUM DECISION OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FILED OCTOBER 24, 1996 
Case NO. 950494-CA 
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OCT 2 *\ 1996 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Bonnie Harris fka Bonnie 
Spivey, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, and 
Cross-appellee, 
v. 
Theresa Gutierrez Spivey, 
Estate of Glendon Spivey, and 
Utah Retirement Systems, 
Defendants, Appellee, and 
Cross-appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 9 5 0494-CA 
F I L E U 
(October 24, I ')9G) 
Fourth District, Provo Department 
The Honorable Anthony W. Schofield 
Attorneys: Charles A. Schultz, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Vernon L. Snow and M. Dayle Jeffs, Provo, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Davis, Bench, and Jackson. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Bonnie Harris appeals the trial court's decision granting 
defendants1 motion to dismiss her petition to modify a 1980 
divorce decree. The trial court held that res judicata and 
laches barred litigation of retirement benefits in question, and 
that the divorce decree could not be modified in an action 
brought after the death of one of the parties to the divorce (Mr. 
Spivey). 
In connection with the motion to dismiss, both sides 
submitted affidavits and documentary evidence to the trial court. 
Therefore, we treat the motion as one for summary judgment. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 12. Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
When Harris and Mr. Spivey divorced in 1900, retirement 
benefits were not recognized as divisible marital property. 
Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1982] ; 
Ostler. 789 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah App. 1990). This court has 
consistently held that retirement benefits can onl / be divided as 
marital property in divorces entered after the Woodward decision. 
Ostler, 789 P.2d at 717 (recognizing "Woodward I is to be given 
prospective application only"); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 
P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988) (holding "legal principles 
articulated in Woodward, should only be given prospective 
application"). Because Harris was not entitled to any of Mr. 
Spivey's retirement benefits at the time of the divorce, she is 
not entitled to any of his retirement benefits now. Having 
determined that the decision can be affirmed on the basis of the 
foregoing amthority, we do not reach the other bases relied upon 
by the trial court. 
Theresa Spivey cross appeals for attorney fees, which were 
denied by the trial court. We find no basis for reversing the 
trial court's decision not to award attorney fc ^s. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all respects. 
No costs awarded. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE COJJCBR^ 
J4v %/?M^ 
James Z. Davis4 
Ass^K/late Pre^f/ding Judge 
£fc^>£—-^ 
Norman H. Jackson ri^Judge 
950494-CA 2 
APPENDIX 
EXHIBIT 2 
BENNETT V. BENNETT 
607 P.2d 839 (Utah 1980) 
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BENNETT v, 
Cite as, Utah, 
3 entitled to be heard upon any 
hat might affect their rights under 
ee.8 
Also, in this regard, it is important 
that an attempt to reform a deed is 
iding in equity.9 A court of equity 
erally not assist one in extricating 
from circumstances which he has 
10
 Plaintiff is solely responsible for 
Hales in a position to convey the 
f, she having conveyed the property 
3 by warranty deed, and Hales hav-
>perly recorded it. Hales merely 
imed to Royal Gardens any legal 
he may have had in the property at 
B of the conveyance.11 
med. Costs to Royal Gardens. 
BENNETT Utah 839 
607P.2d839 
appealed. In a per curiam unpublished 
opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed, and 
husband filed petition for rehearing. The 
Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that fact 
that testimony and findings in case estab-
lished that that portion of husband's retire-
ment fund contributed by United States 
Government had no present value, and may 
not have any value in future, meant that it 
was error for trial court to consider such 
matter as one of assets of parties, thereby 
using it as one of significant predicates in 
court's determination of property division 
between parties provided for in decree. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Crockett, C. J., dissented and filed opin-
ion in which Stewart, J., concurred. 
3KETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN and 
NS, JJ., concur. 
NART, J., concurs in result. 
Carles N. BENNETT, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
Divorce <s=>253(3) 
In divorce action, fact that testimony 
and findings in case established that that 
portion of husband's retirement fund con-
tributed by United States Government had 
no present value, and may not have any 
value in future, meant that it was error for 
trial court to consider such matter as one of 
assets of parties, thereby using it as one of 
significant predicates in court's determina-
tion of property division between parties 
provided for in decree. U.C.A.1953,30-3-5. 
nna Mae BENNETT, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 16268. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 20, 1980. 
i divorce action, the Second District 
Davis County, Maurice J. Harding, 
tered judgment from which husband 
iter Creek Water and Irrigation Co. v. 
say, 21 Utah 192, 60 P. 559 (1900). See 
Houser v. Smith, 19 Utah 150, 56 P. 683 
?) 
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
J. Val Roberts, Centerville, for defendant 
and respondent. 
WILKINS, Justice: 
A petition for rehearing in this divorce 
action was granted by this Court after its 
per curiam unpublished opinion was filed on 
October 19, 1979, which affirmed the action 
of the District Court of Davis County. 
10. State ex rel. Burk v. Oklahoma City, Okl., 
522 P.2d 612 (1973). See also Pacific Metals 
Co. v. Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co., 21 Utah 
2d 400, 446 P.2d 303 (1968) 
:obsen v. Jacobsen, Utah, 557 P.2d 156 11. U.C.A. 1953,57-1-13. 
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Plaintiff and defendant were married on 
May 31, 1947, and have four children as 
issue of this marriage, two of whom are 
emancipated. The two minor children re-
side with defendant, to whom care, custody, 
and control were awarded on November 29, 
1978, by the District Court. 
The only issue we shall address here is 
whether the District Court erred in con-
sidering as an asset of this marriage the 
share of plaintiff's retirement fund contrib-
uted by the United States government. 
The plaintiff is—and has been—employed 
at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. 
The Court, in its award to the defendant 
of the real property of the parties, the 
equity of which was $38,000, imposed a lien 
of $5,000 on that property in favor of the 
plaintiff, making the lien payable upon the 
occurrence of one of four conditions, which 
are not pertinent to this appeal. 
The retirement officer in the Civilian 
Personnel Office at Hill Air Force Base, a 
Margaret S. Woods, testified that as of the 
time of this divorce hearing the present 
value of plaintiff's retirement fund was 
$15,681.95, the amount of his total contribu-
tion. She further stated that the U. S. 
government had contributed the same 
amount to his retirement fund; viz., $15,-
681.95, and that plaintiff could withdraw 
his contribution any time prior to thirty-one 
days before the eligibility date for his 
retirement on May 7,1984. The retirement 
officer further testified, "[t]he amount of 
money that he (plaintiff) has in the retire-
ment fund does not have any bearing on 
what he would get under retirement month-
ly annuity. The only value of what he has 
in the retirement fund is for income tax 
purposes or death benefit purposes." She 
did not elaborate on this last, somewhat 
cryptic, sentence. But, from her uncontra-
dicted testimony, we believe no reasonable 
interpretation can be placed on it other 
than one that concludes no present value 
can be assigned to that portion of plaintiff's 
retirement fund contributed by the U. S. 
1. This section reads: 
"When a decree of divorce is made, the court 
may make such orders in relation to the chil-
government. And the Court in its findu 
found no present value on this portu 
Significantly, the Court, in determini 
what an equitable amount of this h 
should be, frankly acknowledged that 
considered the amount of the governmen 
contribution to plaintiff's retirement fui 
The following dialogue occurred betwe 
the Court and plaintiff's counsel: 
Mr. Vlahos: Your Honor, if I understai 
your Honor's position in reference 
this $5,000.00 lien, it is based on son 
$15,000.00 that the government h 
that he can't touch, has no control ove 
has never seen, rather than takii 
what the parties can have right no\ 
The Court: Yes. That's taken into co 
sideration. I want that understood, i 
that in case you do want to appeal, ar 
have that matter raised you can do s 
In Englert v. Englert, Utah, 576 Pi 
1274, 1276 (1978), this Court in interpretin 
Sec. 30-3-5 l stated: 
It is our opinion that the correct vie^  
under our law is that this encompasses a 
of the assets of every nature possessed b 
the parties, whenever obtained and froi 
whatever source derived; and that thi 
includes any such pension fund or insui 
ance. These should be given due consid 
eration along with all other assets, ir 
come and the earnings and the potentia 
earning capacity of the parties, in deter 
mining what is the most practical, jus 
and equitable way to serve the best inter 
ests and welfare of the parties and thei 
children. (Emphasis added). 
Because the testimony and findings ii 
this case clearly establish that that portioi 
of the plaintiff's retirement fund contribut 
ed by the U. S. government has no presem 
value—and may not have any value in th( 
future—we hold that it was error for the 
District Court to consider this matter as om 
of the assets of the parties, thereby using it 
as one of the significant predicates in the 
Court's determination of property division 
dren, property and parties, and the mamte 
nance of the parties and children, as may be 
equitable * * *" 
PEAY v. PEAY Utah 841 
Cite as, Utah, 607 P.2d 841 
veen the parties provided for in the uity or injustice as to warrant this Court's 
*ee. interference therewith. 
ther matters raised by plaintiff are 
Tied to be without merit. 
eversed and remanded for proceedings 
jerning the matter of property distribu-
between the parties consistent with 
opinion. Affirmed in all other respects, 
costs or attorney's fees are awarded. 
[AUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur. 
ROCKETT, Chief Justice (dissenting): 
would adhere to our prior decision. I 
in hearty agreement with the quote 
m the Englert case that the court should 
sider "all of the assets of every nature 
sessed by the parties whenever obtained 
I from whatever source derived and that 
i includes such pension fund or insur-
ed and this should include anything 
t is realistic and substantial, even in 
•ectancy. To demonstrate the complete 
gic of plaintiff's counsel's argument that 
court should not consider the pension 
id because the plaintiff has never seen it 
lad possession or control over it: suppose 
had been determined in a probate pro-
ding that the plaintiff was to receive a 
«tantial inheritance from a relative's es-
e, but it was not to be paid him until 
apletion of the probate. Would it be 
rued that because he had never seen the 
ney, nor had possession or control over it, 
\ court could not consider it as a part of 
j total circumstances. 
The trial judge was ineluctably correct in 
ting that he had considered all the cir-
nstances, including the possibility that 
i plaintiff would receive the pension re-
Ted to. 
There is a matter far more important and 
ltrolling than the foregoing, quite re-
rdless of the statement the trial judge 
ide, which has provided a basis for fur-
2r controversy, and for this appeal. As 
Iicated in our original opinion, when this 
urt surveys the circumstances of these 
rties, as it may do in such cases, it is my 
STEWART, J., concurs in the views ex-
pressed in the opinion of CROCKETT, C. J. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
Laverne C. PEAY, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Lynn E. PEAY, Defendant and 
Appellant 
No. 16314. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 21, 1980. 
Husband appealed from an order of the 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, David 
Sam, J., denying his motion to vacate and 
set aside a decree of divorce. The Supreme 
Court, Hall, J., held that even if motion to 
vacate and set aside divorce decree was 
viable after modification had been granted, 
appeal from trial court's striking of such 
motion was not timely where not brought 
within one month of entry of the order on 
the original petition to modify or to vacate 
and set aside the decree of divorce. 
Appeal dismissed. 
1. Pretrial Procedure <s=>693 
Denial of a motion to dismiss does not 
necessarily constitute a ruling on the merits 
of a motion. 
2. Divorce <s=»181 
Even if motion to vacate and set aside 
divorce decree was viable after modification 
had been granted, appeal from trial court's 
striking of such motion was not timely, 
where not brought within one month after 
APPENDIX 
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ENGLERT V. ENGLERT 
576 P. 2d 1274 (Utah 1978) 
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Hedwig Camacho ENGLERT, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Edwin ENGLERT, Jr., Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14978. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 23, 1978. 
Former husband appealed from certain 
aspects of the property division provisions 
of a divorce decree entered in the District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder, 
J. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held 
that: (1) where the parties' son was 25 
years old and in absence of any showing 
that he was disabled or limited in his ability 
to support himself, any contribution the 
husband made to his son's support was vol-
untary and did not diminish the amount 
which the decree required him to pay his 
former wife as alimony and child support 
for herself and the parties' minor daughter; 
(2) the trial court properly considered as a 
family asset the husband's accrued retire-
ment fund amounting to $29,717, and (3) 
the husband was not legally obligated to 
provide any support or maintain a life in-
surance policy for the benefit of his 25-
year-old son and was obliged to do so for his 
daughter only until she attained the age of 
18. 
Affirmed as modified. 
1. Divorce <3=>308 
Where divorcing parties' son was 25 
years old and there was no showing that 
the son was disabled or limited in his ability 
to support himself, any contribution that 
father made to support of the son, who was 
a student, was voluntary and did not dimin-
ish the amount which divorce decree re-
quired father to pay to his former wife as 
alimony and child support for herself and 
the parties' 12-year-old daughter. 
2. Divorce <s=>249(3) 
Statute which provides for the nonas-
signability and exception from legal process 
of insurance benefits relates only to the law 
of insurance and has no effect on the equi-
table powers of a court, in a divorce pro-
ceeding, to deal with all assets of the par-
ties. U.C.A.1953, 49-10-48. 
3. Divorce <3=*249(3) 
Statute governing the property rights 
of parties in divorce matters which autho-
rizes the court to make such orders in rela-
tion to the property "as may be equitable", 
encompasses all assets of every nature pos-
sessed by the parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived, includ-
ing pension funds or insurance. U.C.A. 
1953, 30-3-5. 
4. Divorce <s=>249(3) 
In divorce proceeding, trial court did 
not err in considering as a family asset 
husband's accrued retirement fund amount-
ing to $29,717. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
5. Divorce <@=>306, 310 
Divorced father was not legally obli-
gated to provide any support or maintain 
any life insurance policies for the benefit of 
his son who was 25 years of age; father 
was obliged to do so for his daughter only 
until she attained the age of 18. U.C.A. 
1953, 15-2-1. 
Jimi Mitsunaga, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
Harley W. Gustin and Paul H. Liapis, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respon-
dent. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
Defendant Edwin Englert, Jr., appeals 
attacking only certain aspects of the award 
and property disposition in a divorce decree. 
The parties were married on September 
5, 1948, and had two children: Robert, born 
1952, thus now 25, and Diane, born 1965, 
thus now 12. 
During the 28 years of marriage the par-
ties acquired a residence in Salt Lake City, 
ENGLERT v 
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Utah, valued at approximately $40,000 with 
a mortgage of $7,500. They also accumu-
lated other substantial assets consisting of 
savings accounts, land in Duchesne County, 
insurance policies and defendant's retire-
ment fund through the Veterans Hospital, 
where he is Chief of the Gastro-Intestinal 
Section, from which he receives a gross 
income of $2,002.04 per month. 
The trial court appears to have made a 
fair and equitable disposition of these assets 
between the parties and with respect to the 
alimony and support money, with the ex-
ceptions discussed below. 
[1] In regard to his duty to his children, 
appellant's brief states that: "He is volun-
tarily paying $150 to his son." As noted 
above, the son Robert is now 25 years old. 
Even though he is still attending Utah 
State University, there is no showing that 
he is disabled or limited in his ability to 
support himself. Therefore any contribu-
tion defendant makes to Robert is indeed 
voluntaryl and does not diminish the 
amount which the decree requires him to 
pay the plaintiff as alimony and child sup-
port for herself and the daughter Diane. 
Defendant's principal remonstrance 
against the judgment is that the court 
erred in considering as a family asset his 
"accrued retirement fund at the 
Veterans Administration Hospital," 
amounting to $29,717. For the purpose of 
getting to that main contention of the de-
fendant, we spare the admittedly somewhat 
complicated conditions the decree places 
upon the disposition of this fund in an ap-
parent effort to assure payment of the ali-
mony and support money provided therein. 
Defendant argues that his retirement fund 
is not "property" within the meaning of our 
statutes and should not be so considered in 
determining the rights of the parties under 
the divorce decree. He reasons that be-
cause that fund was accumulated as a re-
sult of his service and tenure, it is inequita-
ble to permit the plaintiff to participate 
therein. He cites" In re Marriage of EHis, 
36 Colo.App. 234, 538 P.2d 1347 (1975), 
. ENGLERT Utah 1275 
PJd 1274 
where the Colorado Court of Appeals stat-
ed: 
We hold that the husband's army 
retirement pension and the future retired 
pay to be received thereunder do not con-
stitute property' and are, therefore, not 
subject to division under the Colorado 
statute. 
He also cites Baker v. Baker, Okl., 546 P.2d 
1325 (1976) to the same effect. 
By way of comparison defendant states in 
his brief that "Community-property states, 
notably California, Idaho, New Mexico and 
Oregon, have held that retirement funds 
and pensions that have accrued during the 
marriage are community property and sub-
ject to division between the parties upon 
dissolution of the marriage." Citing e. g. 
Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal.3d 349, 118 Cal.Rptr. 
621, 530 P.2d 589 (1925) and other cases. 
He argues therefrom that because those 
courts refer to that fact in holding that 
retirement benefits are community proper-
ty and thus subject to allocation between 
the spouses when a marriage is dissolved, 
that that indicates that it should not be so 
in states, such as Utah, where the communi-
ty-property status does not exist; and 
urges that holdings in community-property 
state cases are not controlling here and 
should not become our law. Further imple-
menting his argument, he points to U.C.A. 
1953, Sec. 49-10-48 which provides for the 
nonassignability and exception from legal 
process of benefits under insurance. 
[2] With due consideration for the plau-
sibility of the defendant's arguments on the 
grounds just stated, we cannot agree with 
them. Sec. 49-10-48 relates only to the 
law of insurance and can have no effect 
upon the equitable powers of a court in 
divorce matters to deal with all assets of 
the parties. 
[3,4] Our statute which governs the 
property rights of the parties in divorce 
matters, 30-3-5, states* 
1. That this is true except where a child is of supporting himself see Dehm v Dehm, Utah, 
mentally or physically deficient and incapable 545 P 2d 525 (1976) 
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When a decree of divorce is made, the 
court may make such orders in relation to 
the children, property and parties, and 
the maintenance of the parties and chil-
dren, as may be equitable. 
It is to be particularly noted that that lan-
guage is in general terms and contains no 
hint of limitation. The import of our deci-
sions implementing that statute is that pro-
ceedings in regard to the family are equita-
ble in a high degree; and that the court 
may take into consideration all of the perti-
nent circumstances.2 It is our opinion that 
the correct view under our law is that this 
encompasses all of the assets of every na-
ture possessed by the parties, whenever 
obtained and from whatever source derived; 
and that this includes any such pension 
fund or insurance. These should be given 
due consideration along with all other as-
sets, income and the earnings and the po-
tential earning capacity of the parties, in 
determining what is the most practical, just 
and equitable way to serve the best inter-
ests and welfare of the parties and their 
children.3 
[5] Defendant's other ground of attack 
is that the decree requires him to maintain 
certain life insurance policies with his chil-
dren as beneficiaries for a period of 15 
years. On this point defendant is correct. 
He is not legally obligated to provide any 
such support or benefit for his son Robert 
who is 25 years of age; and he is obliged to 
do so for his daughter Diane only until she 
attains the age of 18 years.4 It is therefore 
necessary that the decree be modified ac-
cordingly. 
Affirmed as modified. The parties to 
bear their own costs. 
ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, WIL-
KINS and HALL, JJ., concur. 
2. See Pmion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 
265. 
3. Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P..2d 977. 
4. U.C.A.1953, Sec. 15-2-1, formerly provided 
that the period of minority extended in males 
to 21 years and females to 18 years, but in 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Thomas Michael MANSFIELD, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 15375. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 28, 1978. 
Defendant appealed from his conviction 
in City Court of Brigham City of driving 70 
miles per hour. The First District Court, 
Box Elder County, VeNoy Christoffersen, 
J., permitted State's amendment to com-
plaint and granted defendant's motion to 
dismiss, and State appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Ellett, C. J., held that: (1) complaint 
on appeal from city court could not be 
amended in district court, and (2) where 
amended complaint filed in district court 
was never signed by any complaining wit-
ness, dismissal of complaint was mandated. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law ®=*260.13 
Complaint on appeal from city court 
could not be amended in district court; 
since district court only had derivative jur-
isdiction, if complaint was faulty in city 
court, it remained faulty on appeal. 
2. Indictment and Information <£=»162 
Where defendant was convicted in city 
court of driving 70 miles per hour in viola-
tion of resolution adopted by State Road 
Commission, where, on appeal, district court 
permitted amendment which charged that 
S.L.U.1975, Ch 39, Sec. 1, it was changed to 
make minority extend to 18 years for both 
sexes, however it added that courts in divorce 
actions /nay order support to age 21. See also 
exception noted in Dehm v. Dehm in footnote 1 
above. 
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and he has shown no good cause for reliev-
ing him of his waiver in this case. 
Judge Rokich's dismissal of the petition 
is affirmed. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., and 
ZIMMERMAN and STEWART, J J , 
concur. 
HALL, C.J., concurs in the result. 
OSTLER Jtah 713 
(UtahApp. 1990) 
Affirmed in part, vacated and remand-
ed in part. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Margieann W. OSTLER (Wyatt), and 
the State of Utah, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
Raymond Floyd OSTLER, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 880172-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 20, 1990. 
Former wife filed petition for modifica-
tion of divorce decree. Parties stipulated 
that there was a substantial change of cir-
cumstances sufficient to provide a basis for 
modification of the decree. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, David S. 
Young, J., modified amount of support 
from $75 per month per child to $200 per 
month per child, declined to distribute for-
mer husband's retirement account, but 
awarded wife $250 in attorney fees. Wife 
sought review. The Court of Appeals, 
Bench, J., held that: (1) trial court's failure 
to make specific findings on statutory 
factors constituted reversible error, (2) 
wife articulated no change of circumstanc-
es justifying a reevaluation of original 
property division with regards to husband's 
retirement account; and (3) wife was enti-
tled to an award of attorney fees incurred 
on appeal. 
1. Divorce <s=*309.1 
Trial courts have continuing jurisdic-
tion to make reasonable and necessary 
changes in child support awards, taking 
into account not only the needs of the chil-
dren, but also the ability of the parent to 
pay. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(3). 
2. Divorce ®=>309.2(2) 
A party seeking modification of a child 
support award must show that a substan-
tial change of circumstances has occurred 
since the divorce decree, not contemplated 
within the decree itself. 
3. Divorce <£=>312.6(1) 
Once the trial court has made a deter-
mination on modification of a child support 
award, the Court of Appeals accords its 
ruling substantial deference. 
4. Divorce <a=>286(3, 6) 
The apportionment of financial respon-
sibility in a divorce proceeding will not be 
upset on appeal unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary or the Court 
of Appeals determines that the trial court 
has abused its discretion. 
5. Divorce e=>312.6(8) 
The failure of trial court to enter spe-
cific findings on each of the statutory 
factors for an award of prospective support 
after a material change of circumstances is 
generally reversible error, particularly 
where the trial court orders a party to pay 
support to a child beyond the age of majori-
ty. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7(2) (now (3)). 
6. Divorce <s=>312.6(8) 
Trial court's failure to make specific 
findings as to each of the relevant statu-
tory factors in proceeding to modify child 
support, in which support was increased, 
was reversible error, even though trial 
court's findings noted a "dramatic" in-
crease in husband's income and a "substan-
tial" decline in wife's health. U.C.A.1953, 
78-45-7(2) (now (3)). 
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7. Divorce <e=>286(6) 
Trial court's finding, on former wife's 
petition for modification of divorce decree, 
that former husband's retirement account 
was not vested at time of decree, and that 
value of account at vesting was "sufficient-
ly nominal" such that child support pay-
ments made by husband in excess of legal 
obligation more than compensated wife for 
value of account, was appropriately de-
scribed as a conclusion of law, and given no 
particular deference on review, even 
though trial court described its reasoning 
as a "finding of fact." 
8. Divorce <s=>254(2) 
Former wife was not entitled to por-
tion of former husband's retirement ac-
count, on former wife's petition for modifi-
cation of divorce decree; wife did not re-
ceive portion in initial decree, and wife's 
claim of lack of knowledge of retirement 
benefits did not constitute a change of cir-
cumstances justifying reevaluation of origi-
nal division. 
9. Divorce <3=>288 
Former wife was entitled to award of 
attorney fees reasonably incurred on ap-
peal of her petition for modification of di-
vorce decree, where wife partially pre-
vailed, and wife was in need of the assist-
ance. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
Penny Heal Trask, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs and appellants. 
Harold R. Stephens, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
Before DAVIDSON, BENCH and 
BILLINGS, JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Appellant appeals from an order entered 
in district court modifying a decree of di-
vorce. We affirm the order in part, vacate 
the order in part, and remand. 
Appellant Margieann Ostler and respon-
dent Raymond Floyd Ostler were divorced 
in 1978 after an eighteen-year marriage. 
The decree of divorce awarded appellant 
child support in the amount of $75 per 
month for each of the four children in her 
custody. The decree also provided for visi-
tation rights, alimony, life and health insur-
ance, attorney fees, and distribution of real 
property, personal property, and debts. 
There was no provision for the distribution 
of respondent's retirement account. 
In 1987, appellant filed a petition for 
modification of the divorce decree. Al-
though respondent had voluntarily in-
creased the amount of his child support 
payments from $75 to $110 per month per 
child, appellant sought to increase child 
support to $230 per month for each of the 
three remaining minor children. She also 
sought to distribute respondent's retire-
ment account, and to receive her attorney 
fees and costs. As a basis for modification 
of the decree, appellant stated that she was 
unemployed, on public assistance, and that 
she was unable to obtain employment due 
to a speech disability. She also alleged 
that respondent had remarried and that his 
income had increased substantially. 
Respondent moved to dismiss the petition 
on the grounds that appellant had failed to 
include the State of Utah as the real party 
in interest. Respondent claimed that the 
State was providing appellant with finan-
cial assistance and that the State was also 
assigned appellant's right to receive child 
support payments. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-9(2) (1987). The court subsequent-
ly granted appellant's motion to amend her 
petition to join the State of Utah as co-
plaintiff. 
A hearing on the petition was conducted 
on December 16, 1987. Counsel for the 
State appeared and stated that respondent 
was current in his support obligation, and 
indicated that the State's interest was satis-
fied as long as respondent continued to 
provide at least the existing level of sup-
port. Counsel was then excused. 
The parties stipulated that there was a 
substantial change of circumstances suffi-
cient to provide a basis for modification of 
the decree. The hearing proceeded by 
proffer. The district court subsequently 
issued a memorandum decision modifying 
OSTLER v. 
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the amount of support from $75 per month 
per child to $200 per month per child. It 
remains unclear whether this award was 
premised on the support of three children 
or two children.1 The court declined to 
distribute respondent's retirement account, 
but awarded appellant $250 in attorney 
fees. Appellant now seeks review of the 
amount of child support and the denial of 
retirement benefits. She also requests an 
award of attorney fees on appeal. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
[1-4] Trial courts have continuing juris-
diction to make reasonable and necessary 
changes in child support awards, taking 
into account "not only the needs of the 
children, but also the ability of the parent 
to pay." Woodward v. Woodward, 709 
P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1989). A par-
ty seeking modification of a child support 
award must show that a substantial change 
of circumstances has occurred since the 
divorce decree, not contemplated within the 
decree itself. Woodward, 709 P.2d at 394. 
Once the trial court has made a determina-
tion on modification, we accord its ruling 
substantial deference. Id.; Proctor v. 
Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Utah CtApp. 
1989). The apportionment of financial re-
sponsibility between the parties will not be 
upset on appeal unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary or we deter-
mine that the court has abused its discre-
tion. Woodward, 709 P.2d at 394; Chris-
tensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297, 1299 
(Utah 1981); Proctor, 773 P.2d at 390; 
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 161 
(Utah Ct.App.1989). However, an award of 
child support may be "so inordinately low" 
as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 73 
(Utah Ct.App.1988), cert, granted, 765 P.2d 
1277 (1988). 
The parties in this case stipulated that 
there had been a substantial change of 
circumstances since the original decree. 
The stipulation leaves for resolution wheth-
er the district court abused its discretion in 
1. One of the three minors was nearly eighteen 
at the time of the modification hearing; there-
789P.2d—17 
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modifying the original support award from 
$75 to $200 per month per child. 
[5] In awarding prospective support af-
ter a material change of circumstances, the 
relevant factors to be considered include: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of 
the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(2) (1987); Mar-
tinez, 754 P.2d at 73 n. 3. Because these 
factors "constitute material issues upon 
which the trial court must enter findings of 
fact/' Jefferies v Jeffenes, 752 P.2d 909, 
911 (Utah CtApp 1988), the failure to enter 
specific findings on each of the factors is 
generally reversible error, particularly 
where the court orders a party to pay sup-
port to a child beyond the age of majority. 
Id. at 911-12. 
[6] While the trial court made findings 
of fact, we cannot determine to what ex-
tent these factors were applied. The find-
ings merely note a "dramatic" increase in 
respondent's income and a "substantial" 
decline in appellant's health, and set the 
award at $200 per month per child. The 
lack of specificity in the findings is further 
compounded by the court's award of sup-
port "until each child graduates from high 
school" regardless of age. We conclude 
that the failure of the trial court to make 
specific findings on the statutory factors 
constitutes reversible error. 
Since the case must be remanded for 
entry of more specific findings, we merely 
note the apparent inadequacy in the 
amount of child support awarded. Statu-
tory guidelines now establish base amounts 
of child support. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7.14 (Supp.1989). Although not in 
effect at the time of the trial court's modi-
fication order, see Utah Code Ann. 
fore, only two children of the marriage are now 
below the age of majority. 
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§ 78-45-7.2(l)(a) (Supp.1989), these guide-
lines are useful in determining the adequa-
cy of support. Appellant argues that the 
disparity between the statutory guidelines 
and the trial court's award constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. We are not prepared 
to go quite so far in the absence of specific 
findings, but the financial declarations of 
appellant and respondent contained in the 
record indicate gross monthly incomes of 
$828 and $4,372, respectively. Cf. Mar-
tinez, 754 P.2d at 73 (abuse of discretion 
shown in award of $300 per month per 
child, where incomes were $1,033 and 
$8,333, respectively). Appellant is func-
tionally handicapped, on welfare, and re-
ceiving food stamps. These facts connote 
such a sharp contrast in living standards 
between the parties that $200 per month 
per child appears to be inadequate, and 
thus may constitute an abuse of the court's 
discretion. 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNT 
DISTRIBUTION 
As part of appellant's petition for modifi-
cation, she claimed that respondent's retire-
ment account was undistributed at the time 
of the divorce and should now be so distrib-
uted. Appellant concedes that the decree 
2. The statutory guidelines may be applied to 
child support orders existing prior to July 1, 
1989, as long as the guidelines do not form the 
makes no mention of the retirement ac-
count, but argues that she was not aware 
of it at the time of the divorce. The dis-
trict court refused to modify the divorce 
decree to distribute the retirement account 
on the grounds that it was not vested at 
the time of the decree. The court also 
found that the value of the account at 
vesting was "sufficiently nominal" such 
that child support payments made by re-
spondent in excess of his legal obligation 
more than compensated appellant for the 
value of the account. 
[7] Although the trial court described 
its reasoning as a ''finding of fact," it is 
more appropriately described as a conclu-
sion of law. See State ex rel. Div. of 
Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil, 
Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Utah 1990) (Ap-
pellate court will disregard the label of 
"findings of fact" and look to the sub-
stance.). We accord a trial court's legal 
conclusions no particular deference on ap-
peal, but review them for correctness. 
IFG Leasing Co. v. Gordon, 776 P.2d 607, 
611 (Utah 1989). Without addressing the 
correctness of the district court's rationale, 
we may still affirm the result "on any 
proper ground(s), despite the trial court's 
having assigned another reason for its rul-
ing." Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
[8] Shortly after the district court ren-
dered its decision, this court addressed a 
similar issue in Throckmorton v. Throck-
morton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
Mrs. Throckmorton sought to modify a 
1976 divorce decree, silent as to Mr. 
Throckmorton's retirement benefits, to ob-
tain one-half of those benefits. The trial 
court determined that Mrs. Throckmorton 
had the opportunity to litigate the issue at 
the time of the divorce, and since she failed 
to do so, the claim was barred under the 
doctrine of res judicata. 
Our opinion noted that res judicata "is 
unique in divorce actions because of the 
equitable doctrine which allows courts to 
basis of a material change of circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(1 )(b) (Supp.1989). 
"Child support awards should approxi-
mate actual need and, when possible, as-
sure the children a standard of living com-
parable to that which they would have ex-
perienced if no divorce had occurred." Pe-
terson v. Peterson, 748 P.2d 593, 596 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). Furthermore, it is public 
policy in this state that "children shall be 
maintained from the resources of respon-
sible parents, thereby relieving or avoiding, 
at least in part, the burden often borne by 
the general citizenry through welfare pro- ( 
grams." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45b-l.l 1 
(1987). Since we must vacate the order \ 
and remand for entry of more specific find-
ings, the award of support should either be 
justified under these objectives, or modified 
consistent with the statutory guidelines 
now in effect2 
CURTIS v. CURTIS 
Cite a* 789 PJ2d 717 (UtahApp. 1990) 
reopen alimony, support, or property distri- the attorney 
butions if the moving party can demon-
strate a substantial change of circumstanc-
es since the matter was previously con 
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fees of the party in need. 
This discretionary authority has been held 
to include attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
See Maughan, 770 P.2d at 162-63. Based 
sidered by the court." Id. at 123. We / on appellant's financial declaration, it is 
noted that pension benefits were first rec-
ognized as marital assets in Utah in Wood-
ward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 
1982) ("Woodward F). Throckmorton, 
767 P.2d at 123. We then addressed the 
issue whether Woodward I should be given 
retroactive effect. Id. We ultimately de-
termined that "legal recognition of a new 
category of property rights after a divorce 
decree has been entered, is not itself suffi-
cient to establish a substantial change of 
circumstances justifying a reevaluation of 
the prior property division/' Id. at 124. 
In the instant case, appellant has articu-
lated no change of circumstance justifying 
a reevaluation of the original property divi-
sion. Appellant's claim of lack of knowl-
edge of the retirement benefits does not 
constitute such a change. The only other 
possible change of circumstance is Wood-
ward I's legal recognition of retirement 
benefits as marital assets. However, the 
decree of divorce was entered more than 
four years before the issuance of Wood-
ward I and the modification order was en-
tered a year before the issuance of Throck-
morton. Inasmuch as Woodward I is to 
be given prospective application only, there 
is no appropriate basis on which to divide 
respondent's retirement account. Rather, 
we find the "policy interest favoring the 
finality of property settlements" to be com-
pelling. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124 
(quoting Guffey v. LaChance, 127 Ariz. 
140, 618 P.2d 634, 636 (CtApp.1980)); see 
also Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 368 
(Utah Ct.App.1988). We therefore affirm 
the district court's order with respect to 
retirement benefits. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
[9] Appellant contends she is impecuni-
ous and requests attorney fees on appeal. 
Although she does not cite statute or rule 
for such an award, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-3 (1989) provides that either party 
to a divorce action may be ordered to pay 
apparent that she is in need of such assist-
ance. Since appellant has partially pre-
vailed, we award her attorney fees reason-
ably incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court's order with 
respect to respondent's retirement account. 
The remainder of the order is vacated. 
The issue of child support is remanded for 
the entry of specific findings and an award 
of child support in accordance with those 
findings. We also remand the case for the 
purpose of determining and awarding at-
torney fees and costs reasonably incurred 
by appellant on appeal. 
DAVIDSON and BILLINGS, JJ., 
concur. 
(O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Lauralee CURTIS, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
William Gregory CURTIS, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 890210-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 27, 1990. 
Former wife challenged former hus-
band's failure to return children to Utah 
from Mississippi. Former husband moved 
for enforcement of Mississippi court's mod-
ification of child custody provisions of Utah 
divorce decree. The Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, Boyd L. Park, J., enforced 
Mississippi court's modification of custody. 
Wife appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Orme, J., held that: (1) Mississippi court 
lacked jurisdiction to modify child custody 
while Utah court had continuing jurisdic-
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light most favorable to the court below, 
evidence is insufficient to support the 
ings." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
I 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Fitzger-
v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah 
ipp.1987). Appellant has wholly failed 
sustain this burden. Moreover, the 
rd contains ample evidence from which 
trial court could conclude that Borrego 
nded to disrupt the proceedings. 
] Borrego's second contention is that 
court was required to warn him that his 
iuct was contumacious before a finding 
ontempt could be made. While admit-
that the court indicated that it found 
anity in the courtroom extremely of-
ive, defendant asserts that the state-
t was not an effective warning because 
as "made to Mr. Borrego's attorney 
not to Mr. Borrego directly, and no 
:tion was given to counsel to warn Mr. 
•ego." The assertion is clearly without 
it. The record of proceedings is suffi-
b to establish that Borrego was made 
re that his conduct was inappropriate 
that he was represented by competent 
lsel who was aware of proper court-
n conduct. Finally, Borrego's reliance 
laton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 94 
. 1228, 39 L.Ed.2d 693 (1974) is mis-
ed. Eaton was a per curiam decision 
ing that a trial judge's finding of con-
pt based solely on the use of an exple-
in response to cross-examination could 
be affirmed. The decision specifically 
d that the expletive was not directed 
ird the court and that there was no 
nation in the record of loud or boister-
conduct or any attempt to prevent the 
•t from carrying on its duties. The 
ual situation is markedly different from 
presented by the transcript of proceed-
in the present case. 
] Borrego further contends that the 
ings are insufficient in that they do not 
il how the sentencing "was delayed or 
aly interrupted" by his comments, 
n Code Ann. § 78-32-3 (1987) requires 
court to recite the facts as occurring 
[the court's] immediate view and pres-
»" that support the judgment of con-
pt. The court in this case found, in 
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relevant part, that defendant "became loud 
and boisterous, using profanity which tend-
ed to interrupt the due course of the sen-
tencing hearing." In reviewing a challenge 
to a trial court's factual findings, we apply 
a "clearly erroneous" standard. That stan-
dard requires that "if the findings . . . are 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or 
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made, the findings . . . will be set 
aside." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987). We conclude that the findings 
of the trial court are supported by the 
weight of the evidence and that they ade-
quately support the judgment of the court. 
The judgment of contempt is affirmed. 
GARFF, JACKSON and ORME, JJ., 
concur. 
( o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Guido C. PORCO, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Vincenza Mangio PORCO, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 860150-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 5, 1988. 
Former husband brought motion seek-
ing to terminate alimony, to secure return 
of certain personal property and to recover 
attorney fees. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, John A. Rokich, J., de-
nied motion and ordered former husband to 
pay former wife's attorney fees, and for-
mer husband appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Garff, J., held that: (1) finding that 
there had been no material change in par-
ties' circumstances, as required to modify 
divorce decree, was amply supported by the 
record; (2) absent showing of substantive 
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change in circumstances concerning distri-
bution of property, divorce decree could not 
be modified; (3) trial court's award of at-
torney fees was not in abuse of discretion; 
and (4) former wife was entitled to costs 
and attorney fees on appeal. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
1. Divorce <s=»164 
Having failed to appeal original di-
vorce decree, former husband, in order to 
modify decree, had to show substantial 
change of circumstances occurring since 
entry of decree and not contemplated in 
decree itself. 
2. Divorce <^245(3) 
Finding that there had been no materi-
al change in parties' circumstances, as re-
quired to modify divorce decree, was amply 
supported by the record, which showed 
that former wife still required $200 alimo-
ny award to maintain as nearly as possible 
her previous standard of living and to pre-
vent her from becoming a public charge. 
3. Divorce <3=»254(2), 255 
Absent showing of substantive change 
in circumstances concerning distribution of 
property, divorce decree could not be mod-
ified and matters previously litigated and 
incorporated therein could not be collateral-
ly attacked in face of doctrine of res judica-
ta. 
4. Divorce <3=>254(2) 
Trial court's alleged failure to award 
husband other property in wife's posses-
sion, which he originally purchased, was 
not a changed circumstance as would sup-
port modification of divorce decree. 
5. Divorce <®=>254(1) 
Radial arm saw was not a "hand tool" 
under terms of divorce decree. 
6. Divorce <3=>227(1) 
In divorce action, award of attorney 
fees must be supported by the evidence 
that amount awarded was reasonable and 
that party receiving award was reasonably 
in need. 
7. Divorce <3>227(1) 
Factors of reasonableness of attorn* 
fees in divorce actions include necessity 
number of hours dedicated, reasonablene 
of rate charged in light of difficulty of cai 
and result accomplished, and rates coi 
monly charged for divorce actions in tl 
community. 
8. Divorce <3=>224 
Pleadings, discovery, former husband 
obstreperous behavior, time devoted to pr 
trial matters and actual trial time reflect* 
apparent reasonableness of former wife 
request for attorney fees in divorce actio 
9. Divorce e=*226 
Evidence of former wife's need for a 
sistance in paying her attorney fees unfol< 
ed during entire trial, so special proceedin 
specifically concerned with determining he 
need was not necessary. 
10. Costs <s=*260(5) 
Former husband's frivolous appeal an 
his apparent harassment of former wii 
through repeated civil actions against he 
warranted award of costs and attorne 
fees on appeal. Court of Appeals Rul 
33(a). 
11. Costs <3=>260(1) 
Sanctions for frivolous appeals shoul 
only be applied in egregious cases, les 
there be improper chilling of right to a{ 
peal erroneous trial court decisions, bu 
sanctions should be imposed when appeal i 
obviously without any merit and has beei 
taken with no reasonable likelihood of pre 
vailing and results in delayed implements 
tion of judgment of lower court, increase 
costs of litigation and dissipation of tim 
and resources. Court of Appeals Rule 
33(a), 40(a). 
Joseph H. Gallegos, Michael R. Sciumba 
to, Gallegos & Sciumbato, Salt Lake City 
for plaintiff and appellant. 
John Spencer Snow, Snow & Halliday 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and respon 
dent. 
Before GARFF, JACKSON and 
ORME, JJ. 
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OPINION 
VRFF, Judge: 
aintiff/appellant Guido and defend-
respondent Vincenza Porco were di-
ed on July 14, 1977, after a twenty-sev-
ear marriage. The trial court ordered 
tiff to pay defendant $200 alimony per 
bh and distributed the parties' proper-
imtiff has unsuccessfully attempted to 
mate or modify alimony payments 
times between January 1980 and the 
r of this action on February 29, 1984.1 
tas previously refused to pay alimony, 
h has resulted in several judgments 
garnishment proceedings being taken 
ist him. By his present motion, he 
3 to terminate alimony, to secure the 
•n of certain personal property, and to 
rer attorney fees. Defendant filed a 
m in response to plaintiffs motion 
ing alimony arrearages, attorney fees, 
an order restraining plaintiff from ha-
ng her by continually bringing modifi-
n actions. 
July 31, 1985, the trial court denied 
tiffs motion and ordered him to pay 
idant's attorney fees. Plaintiff con-
; that the trial court abused its discre-
by (1) finding no material change of 
mstances and, thereby, refusing to 
mate alimony; (2) failing to award 
tiff certain items of personal property; 
3) awarding $1,500 in attorney fees to 
idant. 
Plaintiff did not appeal the original 
ce decree. To modify the decree now, 
tiff must show "a substantial change 
•cumstances occurring since the entry 
e decree and not contemplated in the 
>e itself." Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 
710 (Utah 1985). See also Jeppson v. 
son, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984); 
stiansen v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d 
aintiff instituted modification actions m 
nary 1980, May 1980, October 1981, and 
e 1982. 
le original divorce decree was entered on 
' 14, 1977 
aintiff was originally awarded two vehicles, 
tmper, several guns, various hand tools and 
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592, 594 (Utah 1983). The trial court found 
there was no material change of circum-
stances. To overturn this finding, plaintiff 
must show that the evidence clearly pre-
ponderates to the contrary, or that the trial 
court abused its discretion or misapplied 
the law, or that the trial court's award 
works such a manifest injustice as to show 
clearly an abuse of discretion. Gill v. Gill, 
718 P.2d 779, 780 (Utah 1986). However, 
the trial court is afforded considerable dis-
cretion, and its actions are cloaked with a 
presumption of validity. Id.; see also 
King v. King, 717 P.2d 715, 715-16 (Utah 
1986); Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 670 
(Utah Ct.App.1987). 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
[2] The record amply supports the trial 
court's finding that there has been no ma-
terial change in the parties, circumstances. 
Although plaintiffs and defendant's in-
comes have increased, their expenses have 
also increased proportionately, resulting in 
no substantial change in their relative fi-
nancial positions. Defendant still requires 
the $200 alimony award to maintain as 
nearly as possible her previous standard of 
living and to prevent her from becoming a 
public charge. See English v. English, 565 
P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). We affirm the 
trial court on this issue. 
II 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
[3] Ten years after entry of the original 
divorce decree,2 plaintiff requests that this 
Court redistribute certain items of personal 
property.3 Plaintiff has failed to show any 
substantive change of circumstance con-
cerning the distribution of property and 
"personal possessions and affects [sic] as his 
sole and separate property now in his posses-
sion " Defendant was awarded "all of the fur-
nishings and effects, including the fixtures and 
appliances and other personal property in the 
home of the parties not awarded to the plain-
tiff." 
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"[i]n the absence of such a showing, the 
decree shall not be modified and the mat-
ters previously litigated and incorporated 
therein cannot be collaterally attacked in 
face of the doctrine of res judicata. Conse-
quently, [the] attempt to challenge the eq-
uity of the original decree cannot be toler-
ated/' Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 
P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978) (footnote omit-
ted). See also Foulger v. Foulger, 626 
P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981). 
[4] Plaintiff further alleges that the tri-
al court's failure to award him other per-
sonal property in defendant's possession, 
which he originally purchased, has resulted 
in a serious inequity requiring reversal of 
the original property distribution. How-
ever, this is not a changed circumstance, so 
any inequity should have been resolved at 
the original trial or by appeal of that deci-
sion. 
[5] Plaintiff also seeks to have defend-
ant held in contempt of court for failing to 
return to him a radial arm saw. He spe-
ciously argues that it can be operated with 
one hand, and, therefore, under the terms 
of the original decree, is his property as a 
"hand tool." Obviously, a radial arm saw 
is not a hand tool. This argument merely 
epitomizes the frivolous nature of this ap-
peal, and warrants no further comment. 
We thus affirm the trial court's refusal to 
redistribute the personal property. 
Ill 
ATTORNEY FEES 
[6,7] Plaintiff contends that attorney 
fees should not have been awarded to de-
fendant because there was insufficient evi-
dence of defendant's need. In divorce ac-
tions, an award of attorney fees must be 
supported by evidence that the amount 
awarded was reasonable and that the party 
receiving the award was reasonably in 
need. Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 
(Utah 1986). "Relevant factors of reason-
ableness include 'the necessity of the num-
4. In any case, the award might be sustainable 
on an alternate ground, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56 (1987), which authorizes fees 
to be awarded "to a prevailing party if the court 
ber of hours dedicated, the reasonablenes 
of the rate charged in light of the difficult 
of the case and the result accomplishec 
and the rates commonly charged for d 
vorce actions in the community/ " Beats 1 
Beats, 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984) (quo 
ing Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-8 
(Utah 1980)); see also Talley v. Talley, 73 
P.2d 83, 84 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
[8] Defendant's attorney submitted 
well-documented affidavit requestin 
$4,130.70. By comparison, the trial court' 
award of $1,500 was minimal. No cross-aj 
peal concerning the attorney fee awar 
was filed by defendant, and we, according 
ly, have no occasion to consider whethe 
error was committed in awarding this r< 
duced amount. The pleadings, discover] 
plaintiff's obstreperous behavior, time d< 
voted to pre-trial matters, and actual tru 
time all reflect the apparent reasonable 
ness of defendant's request, much less th 
amount actually awarded. 
[9] Evidence of defendant's need for ai 
sistance in paying her attorney fees unfok 
ed during the entire trial, so a special pr< 
ceeding specifically concerned with dete 
mination of her need is not necessary. Th 
Utah Supreme Court similarly concluded i 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 127( 
1279 (Utah 1987), stating: "Because amp] 
evidence of [the wife's] financial conditio 
was before the court, we reject [the hu 
band's] argument that the trial court's fin< 
ing of need was unsupported by the e\ 
dence." 
Because the trial court's award wa 
based on evidence that the amount awar< 
ed was reasonable and defendant was i 
need, the trial court did not abuse its di 
cretion in awarding attorney fees to d 
fendant.4 
IV 
SANCTIONS FOR 
FRIVOLOUS APPEAL 
In oral argument, defendant's couns 
argued for the imposition of sanctions c 
plaintiff for bringing a frivolous appea 
determines that the action or defense to t] 
action was without merit and not brought 
asserted in good faith." 
STATE v. WALKER 
Cite as 752 P.2d 369 (UtahApp. 1988) 
] This Court is distressed both by of his arguments 
Utah 369 
rivolous nature of this appeal and by 
iff s apparent harassment of defend-
hrough repeatedly bringing civil ac-
against her and, thereby, forcing her 
j substantial court costs and attorney 
Rule 33(a) of the Rules of Utah 
of Appeals provides that "[i]f the 
determines that a motion made or an 
1 taken under these rules is either 
)us or for delay, it shall award just 
*es and single or double costs, includ-
asonable attorney fees, to the prevail-
irty." 
find no legal or factual basis for this 
I in the record. Instead, it is merely 
inuation of plaintiff's efforts to ha-
efendant. This Court has previously 
d a frivolous appeal as "one having 
sonable legal or factual basis as de-
in Rule 40(a)."5 O'Brien v. Rush, 
2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct.App.1987); see 
barber v. The Emporium Partner-
50 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
We recognize that sanctions for 
us appeals should only be applied in 
:>us cases, lest there be an improper 
\ of the right to appeal erroneous 
?ourt decisions. However, sanctions 
be imposed when "an appeal is obvi-
vithout any merit and has been tak-
l no reasonable likelihood of prevail-
d results in delayed implementation 
judgment of the lower court; in-
l costs of litigation; and dissipation 
time and resources of the Law 
Auburn Harpswell Ass'n v. Day, 
2d 234, 239 (Me.1981). Therefore, 
rd costs and attorney fees on appeal 
ndant. 
vme point, plaintiff should under-
lat his emotional involvement in this 
mpletely distorts the factual merits 
40(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
s states, in pertinent part, that: 
signature of an attorney or a party consti-
a certificate that the attorney or the 
r has read the motion, brief, or other 
r; that to the best of the attorney's or the 
r's knowledge, information, and belief, 
ed after reasonable inquiry, it is well 
tided in fact and is warranted by existing 
ar a good faith argument for the exten-
modification, or reversal of existing law; 
That message has previ-
ously been delivered five different times by 
the trial court. We wish to make it clear to 
plaintiff, by imposing this sanction, that 
any further efforts on his part to punish 
defendant will only result in his increased 
expenditure of time, effort and money. 
We affirm the trial court's decision and 
remand this matter to the trial court for 
determination of the full amount of costs 
and attorney fees, without reduction, rea-
sonably incurred by defendant on appeal.6 
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur. 
S KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
r^SA^A-W V 
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3. Judgment <S=»644 
Kathleen THROCKMORTON, Doctrine of res judicata applies in di-
Plaintiff and Respondent, vorce actions. 
v. 
cil Dee THROCKMORTON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 870400-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 19, 1988. 
rmer wife filed petition to modify 
• decree, seeking increase in alimony 
from $1 per year to $500 per month, 
eking share of former husband's re-
nt benefits. The Third District 
Salt Lake County, Homer L. Wilkin-
[., increased alimony to $396 per 
, but denied wife's request for one 
f husband's retirement benefits, and 
r husband appealed and former wife 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bill-
J., held that: (1) decision in Wood-
, that pension benefits were marital 
5 subject to distribution, was not sub-
ial change of circumstances justifying 
tluation of property division; (2) for-
wife met burden of showing substan-
change of circumstances justifying 
fication of alimony provision; and (3) 
tnd was necessary to obtain further 
ngs from trial court to support amount 
limony award. 
Affirmed in part; reversed and re-
ided in part. 
Divorce <s=>254(2) 
Trial court's discretionary power to 
hion equitable property division extends 
lally to subsequent modifications of ear-
decree, which actions are entitled to 
s^umption of validity. 
Divorce <s=»286(3, 5) 
Absent showing of clear and preju-
cial abuse of discretion, Court of Appeals 
4. Divorce <s=>254(2) 
Legal recognition of new category of 
property rights after divorce decree has 
been entered is not in itself sufficient to 
establish substantial change of circum-
stances justifying reevaluation of prior 
property division. 
5. Courts <s=>100(l) 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Woodward, that pension benefits are mari-
tal assets subject to distribution in divorce 
proceeding, has prospective application 
only. 
6. Divorce <s=>254(2) 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Woodward, recognizing pension benefits as 
marital assets subject to distribution, did 
not constitute substantial change of cir-
cumstances which would allow former wife 
to bring action to modify divorce decree 
rendered prior to decision in Woodward to 
obtain one-half of former husband's retire-
ment benefits. 
7. Divorce <&=>245(2) 
Former wife met burden of showing 
substantial change of circumstances occur-
ring since entry of divorce decree, and not 
contemplated in decree itself, justifying 
modification of alimony provision, where 
former wife no longer received any child 
support payments since all children had 
reached majority, and wife had become un-
employed due to serious medical condition. 
8. Divorce <3=*240(2) 
Trial court must consider three factors 
in setting reasonable award of alimony: 
financial conditions and needs of receiving 
spouse; ability of receiving spouse to pro-
duce sufficient income for him or herself; 
and ability of responding spouse to provide 
support. 
9. Divorce <s=>287 
Modification of divorce decree to in-
crease alimony to former wife from $1 per 
"oar to $396 per month required remand, 
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mer husband's or former wife's monthly 
expenses, and record did not indicate 
whether former wife was presently receiv-
ing any income from other sources or ex-
tent and probable duration of former wife's 
medical problems which caused her unem-
ployment. 
Robert M. McRae, McRae & DeLand, 
Vernal, for defendant and appellant. 
Nolan J. Olsen, Olsen & Olsen, Midvale, 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
Before GARFF, BILLINGS and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellant, Cecil Throckmorton ("Mr. 
Throckmorton"), appeals the trial court's 
order modifying the parties' divorce decree 
increasing the alimony to be paid respon-
dent, Gail Throckmorton ("Mrs. Throckmor-
ton"), from $1 per year to $396 per month 
Mrs. Throckmorton cross-appeals, arguing 
the trial court erred in denying her request 
for one-half of Mr. Throckmorton's retire-
ment benefits. We affirm in part and re-
verse in part. 
The Throckmortons were married on 
May 27, 1955, and had eight children dur-
ing the course of their twenty-one-year 
marriage. All of the children have reached 
majority. 
The parties were divorced on September 
13, 1976. 
At the time of the divorce, Mr. Throck-
morton was a police officer making $19,040 
annually. Mrs. Throckmorton was not em-
ployed outside the home. 
The divorce decree awarded Mrs. Throck-
morton custody of the parties' five minor 
children and ordered Mr. Throckmorton to 
pay $85 per child per month in child sup-
port, for a total of $425 per month. Mr. 
Throckmorton was also ordered to pay ali-
mony in the amount of $1 per year. Mrs. 
Throckmorton was awarded the family 
home, subject to the outstanding mortgage. 
When the home was sold in 1983, Mrs. 
Throckmorton received the equity of $24,-
000. Mr. Throckmorton was ordered to 
pay approximately $12,000 in marital debts 
incurred during the course of the marriage. 
The divorce decree ^was silent regarding 
Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits. 
Mrs. Throckmorton is presently unem-
ployed and suffering frpm numerous medi-
cal problems prompting her doctor to rec-
ommend open heart surgery. Mr. Throck-
morton is retired and receives retirement 
benefits of $18,970 annually. 
Mrs. Throckmorton filed this petition to 
modify the divorce decree on September 26, 
1986, seeking an increase in the alimony 
award from $1 per year to $500 per month, 
and seeking a share of Mr. Throckmorton's 
retirement benefits. Mrs. Throckmorton 
claims that at the time of the original de-
cree, she was unaware she had any legal 
rights in the retirement benefits. 
The trial court, by stipulation of counsel, 
accepted both proffered evidence and the 
sworn testimony of the Throckmortons. 
The trial court found a substantial change 
of circumstances warranted an increase in 
alimony to $396 per month based on Mrs. 
Throckmorton's current unemployment, 
medical problems, and the fact she current 
ly receives no child support. 
The trial court further held Mrs. Throck-
morton's claim to her former husband's 
retirement benefits was barred by the doc-
trine of res judicata. 
Two issues are presented on appeal. 
First, whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Mrs. Throckmorton's 
claim to Mr. Throckmorton's retirement 
benefits. Second, whether there was a 
substantial change of circumstance since 
the date of the original decree to justify an 
increase in alimony to $396 per month. 
Standard of Review 
[1,2] Trial courts have considerable dis-
cretion to adjust divorcing parties' financial 
and property interests. See, e.g., Ruhsam 
v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 124 (Utah Ct. 
App.1987). The discretionary power to 
fashion an equitable property division ex-
tends equally to subsequent modifications 
of an earlier decree. McCrary v. 
McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979). 
tt«tOCKMORTON v. 
Cite as 767 P.2d 121 
Moreover, the trial court's actions are enti-
tled to a presumption of validity. Ruhsam, 
742 P.2d at 124. Absent a showing of a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, we 
will not interfere with an alimony or prop-
erty award. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988); Eames v. 
Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah CtApp. 
1987). 
Retirement Benefits 
We first address whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying Mrs. 
Throckmorton's claim to one-half of her 
former husband's retirement benefits. The 
trial court "has continuing jurisdiction to 
make subsequent changes or new orders 
for the support and maintenance of the 
parties, . . . or the distribution of the prop-
erty as is reasonable and necessary." 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1988). Ac-
cord Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 
181, 186 (Utah 1981). However, in order to 
modify a prior property award, the moving 
party must establish a substantial change 
of circumstances "which was not within the 
original contemplation of the parties or the 
court at the time the original decree was 
rendered." Thompson v. Thompson, 709 
P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985). Courts are par-
ticularly hesitant to disturb prior property 
distributions. See Guffey v. LaChance, 
127 Ariz. 140, 618 P.2d 634, 636 (Ct.App. 
1980). 
In the instant case, the trial court found ^ 
that Mrs. Throckmorton's claim to one-half 
of Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits 
was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
According to the trial court, Mrs. Throck-
morton had the opportunity to litigate the 
issue of her rights to Mr. Throckmorton's 
retirement benefits at the time of the origi-
nal divorce, and did not do so. Mrs. 
Throckmorton, however, contends that al-
though she was aware of the existence of 
Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits at 
the time of the original divorce, Utah law 
did not recognize pension benefits as mari-
tal assets subject to distribution. Thus, 
she claims that the subsequent recognition 
of pension benefits as marital assets by the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Wood-
ward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 
THROCKMORTON Utah 123 
(UtahApp. 1988) 
1982), is a substantial change of circum-
stances which precludes application of the 
doctrine of res judicata. We disagree and 
affirm the trial court's refusal to reopen 
the issue of the distribution of Mr: Throck-
morton's retirement benefits. 
[3] The doctrine of res judicata applies 
in divorce actions. Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 
703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985). "When 
there has been an adjudication, it becomes 
res judicata as to those issues which were 
either tried and determined, or upon all 
issues which the party had a fair opportuni-
ty to present and have determined in the 
other proceeding." Id. (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 P.2d 
1287, 1289 (Utah 1980)). However, the ap-
plication of res judicata is unique in divorce 
actions because of the equitable doctrine 
which allows courts to reopen alimony, sup-
port, or property distributions if the mov-
ing party can demonstrate a substantial 
change of circumstances since the matter 
was previously considered by the court 
See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 
360 (Utah 1985). 
[4-6] We must determine whether the 
subsequent legal recognition of retirement 
benefits as marital property subject to dis-
tribution in a divorce case is a substantial 
change of circumstances, thereby preclud-
ing the application of res judicata. Or 
more specifically, whether Woodward 
should be given retroactive effect. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals recently 
addressed this issue in Guffey v. La-
Chance, 127 Ariz. 140, 618 P.2d 634 (Ct. 
App.1980), a factually similar case. In 
Guffey, the wife sought to modify a seven-
and-one-half-year-old divorce decree in or-
der to share in her former husband's mili-
tary retirement benefits. The divorce de-
cree was silent regarding his pension even 
though both parties were aware of the 
benefits at the time of the divorce. When 
the original decree was entered, the Arizo-
na courts had yet to decide whether unvest-
ed pension benefits were community as-
sets. However, at the time of the modifica-
tion, pension benefits were deemed a prop-
erty right subject to division in a divorce 
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decree. Nonetheless, the court denied the 
wife's request to modify, stating, "[tjhere 
is a compelling policy interest favoring the 
finality of property settlements" and this 
policy would be "greatly undermined if the 
court were to allow the potential for reex-
amination of every military divorce prior to 
the enactment of the rule." Id. 618 P.2d at 
636. 
We agree with the Arizona Court of Ap-
peals and find that legal recognition of a 
new category of property rights after a 
divorce decree has been entered, is not 
itself sufficient to establish a substantial 
change of circumstances justifying a re-
evaluation of a prior property division. 
Thus, we hold that the legal principles ar-
ticulated in Woodward, should only be giv-
en prospective application.1 
Alimony 
We next address whether the award of 
$396 per month in alimony to Mrs. Throck-
morton was an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion. 
"[T]he threshold requirement for relief 
[in a petition for modification of a divorce 
decree] is a showing of a substantial 
change of circumstances occurring since 
the entry of the decree and not contem-
plated in the decree itself." Naylor v. 
Naylor, 700 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985). "A 
relative change in the income and expenses 
of the parties, if comparatively significant, 
can amount to a substantial change in cir-
cumstances" justifying a modification of a 
prior alimony award. Jeppson v. Jeppson, 
684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984). 
[7] In the instant case, Mrs. Throckmor-
ton met her burden. She is no longer 
receiving any child support payments since 
all the children have now reached majority. 
She is currently unemployed due to a seri-
ous medical condition. Accordingly, we af-
firm the trial court's finding of a substan-
1. Allowing Mr. Throckmorton to keep his retire-
ment benefits considering the totality of the 
original property distribution, does not offend 
our sense of justice. Mr. Throckmorton, under 
the original decree, was ordered to pay $12,000 
in marital debts while Mrs. Throckmorton was 
awarded the family home and ultimately re-
tial change of circumstances justifying a 
modification of the alimony provision. 
[8] The issue then becomes whether the 
trial court's award of $396 per month in 
alimony was an abuse of discretion. The 
purpose of alimony is to "enable the receiv-
ing spouse to maintain as nearly as possi-
ble the standard of living enjoyed during 
the marriage and to prevent the spouse 
from becoming a public charge." Eames v. 
Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah CtApp. 
1987) (citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 
100-01 (Utah 1986)). A trial court must 
consider three factors in setting a reason-
able award of alimony: 1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the receiving 
spouse; 2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to produce a sufficient income for 
him or herself; and 3) the ability of the 
responding spouse to provide support. 
Eames, 735 P.2d at 397. 
Moreover, it is reversible error if a trial 
court fails to make findings on all material 
issues unless the facts in the record are 
" 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment'" Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. 
Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). 
Utah courts have consistently found an 
abuse of discretion in setting alimony when 
the trial court failed to make findings on 
the financial conditions and needs of the 
receiving spouse. See, e.g., Higley v. Hig-
ley, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983) (remand-
ed since the trial court made no findings 
with regard to the receiving spouse's abili-
ty to work); Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 
123, 126 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (trial court 
failed to adequately address the financial 
needs of the claimant spouse, making it 
necessary for the reviewing court to re-
mand the issue for further findings). 
[9] The trial court found and the record 
supports that Mrs. Throckmorton is pres-
ceived $24,000 equity in that home. This is 
especially true since the trial court did increase 
the original alimony provision. The award of 
alimony appears to be a more appropriate meth-
od for dealing with the parties' present circum-
stances. 
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ently unable to produce sufficient income 
for herself due to her medical problems, 
and that Mr. Throckmorton is able to pro-
vide support due to his annual retirement 
income of $18,900. The record, however, is 
void of any facts as to Mr. Throckmorton's 
or Mrs. Throckmorton's monthly expenses 
which are relevant both to Mrs. Throckmor-
ton's "need" and Mr. Throckmorton's abili-
ty to pay. Neither does the record indicate 
whether Mrs. Throckmorton is presently 
receiving any income from other sources or 
the extent and probable duration of her 
medical problems. 
Mrs. Throckmorton requested $500 per 
month as alimony but was awarded only 
$396 per month. Although it is apparent to 
this Court that an increased alimony award 
is justified, due to the lack of facts or 
findings of both Mrs. Throckmorton's need 
and Mr. Throckmorton's ability to pay, we 
cannot determine if the trial court's award 
was an abuse of discretion. Thus, we va-
cate the alimony award and remand for 
appropriate findings on all the Eames 
factors. 
In summary, we conclude that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in re-
fusing to reopen the issue of the distribu-
tion of Mr. Throckmorton's retirement ben-
efits. However, we do find that the trial 
court abused its discretion in setting the 
amount of alimony at $396 per month with-
out making a determination as to Mrs. 
Throckmorton's need and Mr. Throckmor-
ton's ability to pay. The judgment of the 
trial court is affirmed in part and reversed 
and remanded in part to redetermine the 
appropriate amount of alimony to be 
awarded to Mrs. Throckmorton. 
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
| KlY NUMBIR SYSUM> 
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIA-
TION, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
ULTRASYSTEMS WESTERN CON-
STRUCTORS, INC., and Industrial In-
demnity Company, Defendants and Re-
spondents. 
No. 870212-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 29, 1988. 
Electric cooperative which solicited 
bids for construction project sued for for-
feiture of lowest bidder's bid bond, due to 
lowest bidder's subsequent addition of $75,-
000 to its bid due to a misunderstanding of 
the type of work required on certain items. 
The Seventh District Court, Duchesne 
County, Richard C. Davidson, J., entered 
summary judgment for bidder, and cooper-
ative appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Bench, J., held that: (1) cooperative's mo-
tion for a new trial after the summary 
judgment was entered tolled the time per-
mitted for appeal of the summary judg-
ment; (2) trial court properly denied coop-
erative's motion for new trial; and (3) coop-
erative was not entitled to forfeiture of the 
bid bond. 
Affirmed. 
1. New Trial <s=>4 
Motion for new trial, following grant 
of summary judgment, is procedurally cor-
rect. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 56, 59, 59(a). 
2. Appeal and Error <3=>345(1) 
Motion for new trial tolled time permit-
ted for appeal after entry of summary 
judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 56, 59, 
59(a, b); Court of Appeals Rule 4(a). 
3. New Trial ®= 140(1) 
Party against whom summary judg-
ment was entered was not entitled to new 
trial despite party's argument that its un-
timely filed affidavits as well as opponent's 
unpublished depositions "clearly establish 
the injustice that will be accomplished" if 
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Marvin L. WOODWARD, Plaintiff, 
Appellant and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
Mildred L. WOODWARD, Defendant, 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant. 
No. 18089. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 4, 1982. 
The First District Court, Box Elder 
County, VeNoy Christoffersen, J., granted 
divorce with property division, and husband 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., 
held that: (1) trial court properly awarded 
wife share in that portion of husband's 
retirement benefits to which rights accrued 
during marriage, notwithstanding that hus-
band was not entitled to such benefits until 
he worked additional 15 years, and (2) 
award of such benefits was properly made 
in form of deferred distribution based upon 
fixed percentage. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
1. Divorce <s=>252.3(4) 
Concept of "vesting" of retirement and 
pension rights is inappropriate basis for de-
termining what property should be subject 
to equitable division in divorce proceeding. 
2. Divorce <s=> 252.3(1, 4) 
In fashioning equitable property divi-
sion in divorce proceeding, court may take 
into consideration all pertinent circumstanc-
es, encompassing all assets of every nature 
possessed by parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived, and in-
cluding retirement and pension rights; 
overruling Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P.2d 
839. 
3. Divorce <e=>252.3(l) 
Whether resource is subject to distribu-
tion in divorce proceeding does not turn on 
whether spouse can presently use or control 
it, or on whether resource can be given 
present dollar value; essential criterion is 
. WOODWARD Utah 431 
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whether right to benefit or asset has ac-
crued in whole or in part during marriage, 
and, to extent that right has so accrued, it 
is subject to equitable distribution. 
4. Divorce <s=>252.3(4) 
In divorce proceeding, trial court prop-
erly awarded wife one-half share in that 
portion of husband's government retire-
ment benefits to which rights accrued dur-
ing marriage, notwithstanding that hus-
band was not entitled to any such benefits 
until and unless he worked additional 15 
years at government job. 
5. Divorce <s=>252.3(4) 
Where husband's right to retirement 
benefits was contingent upon his working 
an additional 15 years, trial court properly 
awarded wife share in such benefits in form 
of deferred distribution based upon fixed 
percentage. 
Brian R. Florence, Ogden, for plaintiff, 
appellant and cross-respondent. 
Ben H. Hadfield, Brigham City, for de-
fendant, respondent and cross-appellant. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The plaintiff husband appeals from that 
portion of the trial court's decree of divorce 
which awarded to the defendant wife a 
portion of his retirement benefits. The 
husband argues that the court erred in con-
sidering, as a marital asset, that portion of 
his pension which would be contributed by 
the government at some future date. 
The husband has worked as a civilian 
employee at Hill Air Force Base for fifteen 
years. Under his government pension plan, 
he has contributed $17,500 to the pension 
fund during that time. If he were to leave 
his job now, he would receive only the 
amount of his contributions. In order to 
receive maximum benefits from the plan, 
the husband would have to participate in it 
for a total of 30 years. At that time, the 
government would match the amount of his 
contributions and the husband could elect to 
receive the benefits as an annuity or as a 
lump sum. In its Findings of Fact, the trial 
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court stated that, because one-half of the 
30-year period occurred during the mar-
riage and because the wife is entitled to 
one-half of the amount accrued during that 
time, the wife was therefore "granted an 
equity interest of one-fourth of all proceeds 
which the [husband] receives on his retire-
ment account, to be paid to [the wife] . . . 
as [the husband] receives the proceeds.*' 
The husband concedes that the wife is enti-
tled to one-half of the sum he has contribut-
ed during the fifteen years of their mar-
riage. However, he claims that she has no 
right or interest in the amount to be con-
tributed by the government at the time of 
his retirement because that amount is con-
tingent upon his continued government em-
ployment. 
[1,2] The only authority cited by the 
husband for his position is Bennett v. Ben-
nett, Utah, 607 P.2d 839 (1980). In that 
case, this Court reversed a trial court's divi-
sion of the husband's retirement benefits 
because the government's future contribu-
tion to the retirement fund was found to 
have "no present value." Id. at 840. How-
ever, in Dogu v. Dogu, Utah, 652 P.2d 1308 
(1982), we commented that "that holding 
reflected a failure of proof." Id. The wife 
urges the adoption of the position taken by 
the California Supreme Court in In re Mar-
riage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 
126 Cal.Rptr. 633 (1976). There the court 
held that "[p]ension rights, whether or not 
vested, represent a property interest; to 
the extent that such rights derive from 
employment during coverture, they com-
prise a community asset subject to division 
in a dissolution proceeding." Id. at 562-63, 
126 CaLRptr. at 634-35. This case over-
ruled an earlier California case of long-
standing which had distinguished pension 
rights on the basis of whether the rights 
had vested. In the context of Utah law, we 
find it unnecessary to consider whether or 
1. In Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 
(1975), the court commented that "the concept 
of vesting should probably find no significant 
place in the developing law of equitable distri-
bution." Id. at 348, 331 A.2d at 262. The court 
refers briefly to the origins of the vested inter-
est as it was associated with the concept of 
not the pension rights are "vested or non-
vested." l In Englert v. Englert, Utah, 576 
P.2d 1274 (1978), we emphasized the equita-
ble nature of proceedings dealing with the 
family, pointing out that the court may 
take into consideration all of the pertinent 
circumstances. These circumstances en-
compass "all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived; and 
that this includes any such pension fund or 
insurance." Id. at 1276. To the extent that 
Bennett v. Bennett, supra, may limit the 
ability of the court to consider all of the 
parties' assets and circumstances, including 
retirement and pension rights, it is express-
ly overruled. 
[3] In the instant case, the husband ar-
gues that because he cannot now benefit 
from the government's promised contribu-
tions to his pension at the time of retire-
ment, the wife should not receive any por-
tion of the benefits which are based on the 
government's participation. This argument 
fails to recognize that pension or retirement 
benefits are a form of deferred compensa-
tion by the employer. If the rights to those 
benefits are acquired during the marriage, 
then the court must at least consider those 
benefits in making an equitable distribution 
of the marital assets. "The right to re-
ceive monies in the future is unquestionably 
. . . an economic resource' subject to equita-
ble distribution based upon proper computa-
tion of its present dollar value." Kikkert v. 
Kikkert, 177 N.J.Super. 471, 475, 427 A.2d 
76, 78 (1981) (emphasis and omission in orig-
inal) (quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 
464, 468, 375 A.2d 659, 662 (1977)), aff'd, 88 
N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981). Whether that 
resource is subject to distribution does not 
turn on whether the spouse can presently 
use or control it, or on whether the resource 
can be given a present dollar value. The 
essential criterion is whether a right to the 
seisin and also to its use in connection with 
"vested rights" in discussions of Constitutional 
guaranties. We agree that this concept of 
"vesting" is an inappropriate basis for deter-
mining what property should be subject to eq-
uitable division in a divorce proceeding. 
WOODWARD v 
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benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in 
part during the marriage. To the extent 
that the right has so accrued it is subject to 
equitable distribution. 
[4] In the instant case, the husband 
must work for another fifteen years to 
qualify for the maximum benefits under 
the pension plan. He will not qualify in the 
twenty-ninth year or in the next to the last 
month. Because he must work for a total 
of thirty years, his pension benefits, includ-
ing any contribution by the government, 
are as dependent on the first fifteen years 
as the last fifteen. Thus, the wife is enti-
tled to share in that portion of the benefits 
to which the rights accrued during the mar-
riage. We hold that the trial court did not 
err in making equitable distribution of the 
husband's retirement benefits. 
[5] We also hold that the method used 
to distribute the retirement benefits was a 
proper exercise of the court's discretion. 
We agree with the discussion in Kikkert, 
supra, where it was stated: 
Long-term and deferred sharing of finan-
cial interests are obviously too susceptible 
to continued strife and hostility, circum-
stances which our courts traditionally 
strive to avoid to the greatest extent 
possible. This goal may be best accom-
plished, if a present value of the pension 
plan is ascertainable, by fixing the other 
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all 
appropriate considerations, including the 
length of time the pensioner must survive 
to enjoy its benefits, to be satisfied out of 
other assets leaving all pension benefits 
to the employee himself. 
On the other hand, where other assets 
for equitable distribution are inadequate 
or lacking altogether, or where no 
present value can be established and the 
parties are unable to reach agreement, 
resort must be had to a form of deferred 
distribution based upon fixed percent-
ages. 
Id. at 478, 427 A.2d at 79-80. The facts in 
the present case present just such a circum-
stance: other assets available for equitable 
distribution are inadequate, and a present 
value of retirement benefits would be diffi-
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cult if not impossible to ascertain because 
the value of the benefits is contingent on 
the husband's decision to remain working 
for the government. In such a case, "the 
trial court could use a method widely em-
ployed in other states, whereby the trial 
court determines what percentage of the 
marital property each spouse is to receive, 
and then divides payments from the pension 
plan accordingly." Selchert v. Selchert, 90 
Wis.2d 1, 10, 280 N.W.2d 293, 298 (1979). 
The Wisconsin court continued: 
Under this approach it is unnecessary to 
make any determination as to the value 
of the pension fund. . . . When the bene-
ficiary spouse then opts to receive pay-
ments under the pension plan, the non-
covered spouse would be entitled to her 
established percentage of those pay-
ments . . . . Any risk associated with the 
fund . . . would be by this method appor-
tioned equally between the parties. This 
method may [sic] particularly appropriate 
where the present value of a pension 
fund is very difficult or impossible to 
assess. 
Id. at 10-12, 280 N.W.2d at 298 (footnotes 
omitted). 
The trial court awarded one-half of the 
marital property to each of the parties in 
the instant case. It is clear that the court 
intended the wife to receive one-half of the 
retirement benefits which had accrued dur-
ing the fifteen-year marriage. However, in 
its order, the court specified that the wife 
receive one-fourth of the proceeds of the 
retirement plan as they are received by the 
husband. This portion, one-fourth, awards 
to the wife one-half of the benefits accrued 
during the marriage only if the husband 
works for the full thirty years. The order 
should be modified to provide for the wife 
to receive one-half of the benefits accrued 
during the marriage, regardless of the 
length of time the husband continues in the 
same employment. Whenever the husband 
chooses to terminate his government em-
ployment, the marital property subject to 
distribution is a portion of the retirement 
benefits represented by the number of 
years of the marriage divided by the num-
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ber of years of the husband's employment 
The wife is entitled to one-half of that 
portion pursuant to the award of the trial 
judge in this case, which our modification is 
intended to sustain. 
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in 
part and remand to the trial court so that 
the order may be amended to conform with 
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and 
HOWE, JJ., concur. 
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Kristine H. BOWEN and Cynthia Bowen, 
an infant by Nathaniel Bowen, her 
guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, 
v. 
RIVERTON CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, Sterling R. Draper and Enoch 
Smith Sons Company, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 17732. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 4, 1982. 
In a personal injury action, the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S. 
Sawaya, J., granted summary judgment for 
city and subsequently, pursuant to motions 
and stipulations in consolidated actions, dis-
missed all claims, counterclaims and cross 
claims with prejudice except for claim 
against city, and plaintiffs appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) 
appeal was timely filed, and (2) whether 
city fulfilled its duty to maintain city 
streets in safe condition was question of 
fact for jury, precluding summary judg-
ment. 
Reversed and remanded for trial. 
1. Appeal and Error <§=>430(1) 
Since failure to file timely notice of 
appeal is jurisdictional, Supreme Court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal if notice 
was not timely filed. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 
42(a), 73(a). 
2. Appeal and Error <^344, 428(2) 
Trial court's April 13 order, entered 
pursuant to stipulation of counsel in both 
consolidated actions, was final judgment in 
each case for purpose of calculating timeli-
ness of appeal, and thus plaintiffs, who on 
May 12, 1981, filed notice of appeal, timely 
filed appeal from trial court's grant of sum-
mary judment on January 26 for city. 
3. Judgment o=> 181(2, 3) 
Summary judgment is proper only if 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admis-
sions show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as matter of law. 
4. Judgment e=>185(2) 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, doubt should 
be resolved in favor of opposing party on 
motion for summary judgment and thus 
court must evaluate all evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from ev-
idence in light most favorable to party op-
posing summary judgment. 
5. Judgment <3=>180 
Summary judgment is appropriate only 
in the most clear-cut negligence cases. 
6. Municipal Corporations <s=> 757(1) 
City has nondelegable duty to exercise 
due care in maintaining streets within its 
corporate boundaries in reasonably safe 
condition for travel and may be held liable 
for injuries proximately resulting from its 
failure to do so. 
7. Municipal Corporations <s=:>798 
In fulfilling its nondelegable duty to 
maintain streets, it is necessary for cities to 
maintain traffic signals in reasonably safe, 
visible and working condition. 
